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the only course open to it in view of our dual system of govern-
ment and the problems that it raises. This is just another example
of the futility of the present double sovereignty system. It can-
not cope with a big problem of this sort. The benefits of one
nation-wide telephone system are great and in fact such a unifi-
cation is practically necessary. Then why not a federal com-
mission to regulate such a system? This brings up the consti-
tutionality of such a commission-a problem beyond the scope
of this note.
ROBT. B. SNOW, JR., '30.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
The recognition of the right of privacy as a complement to the
rules of libel and slander in the field of tort law has received a
definite stimulus by a recent Kentucky case, Brents v. Morgan,
decided in 1927.1 In this case a petition alleging that defendant
caused a notice to be placed on a show window fronting on a
principal street stating that "Dr. M (plaintiff) owes an account
here of $49.67, and, if promises would pay an account, this ac-
count would have been settled long ago," was held to state a
good cause of action in tort for an unwarranted invasion of the
plaintiff's right of privacy. In the decision the court declares its
unqualified adherence to the recognition of such a right where
the actions of libel and slander are not adequate to meet such
situations.
The field of privacy, as such, is of relatively modern develop-
ment, and has been inadequately treated both in decisions and
in text-books. Nor has its scope received accurate and perma-
nent definition to meet the exigencies of a body of law in the
process of formation. The principal case defines the right as
the "right to be let alone; that is, the right to be free from un-
warranted publicity, or the right to live without unwarranted in-
terference by the public in matters with which it is not neces-
sarily concerned." "A more specific but less accurate definition
is the right to live without having one's name, picture or statue,
or that of a relative, made public against his will."'2 Con-
ceptually treated, the right is one of personal immunity and can
have no logical basis as a rule of property.
The right had little or no recognition at early common law,
and finds no mention in the classic commentaries. It was in-
volved, directly or indirectly, in a number of cases, but in none
was there a complete acceptance or rejection of the right, and
1221 Ky. 765, 299 S. W. 967.
221 R. C. L. 1196.
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in none was the decision put on the tort basisA From a his-
torical viewpoint the major obstacle to an earlier recognition of
the right was the inability of the common law courts to recog-
nize a right of action for sentimental and psychological injuries
entirely apart from and unconnected with invasions of rights of
property or physical security. The development in the field of
privacy is indicative of the trend away from the narrow common
law viewpoint. 4 Where the courts have not recognized mental
suffering under certain circumstances as giving rise to a cause
of action, they have generally considered it as an element of
damage.5 And in the construction of a railroad, as well as in
condemnation proceedings, the loss of privacy has been held to
contribute to the damage.6
The earlier and more common form of violation of the right
has consisted of the unauthorized publication of the plaintiff's
photograph or name, usually for advertising purposes. The
right has been encroached upon in fewer instances as a means
of enforcing the collection of debts, as in the principal case, with
such variations in method as the leaving of collectors' notices and
the advertisement of accounts for sale. In such cases the courts
have not been careful to distinguish the libel theory from the
closely related theory of privacy:
Until 1890 the right of privacy as a new basis in tort liability
received no recognition, either in decision or in article. In that
year an article by Warren and Brandeis served to focus atten-
tion on this new development in a way distinctly favorable to the
extension of the right.8 In addition the authors proposed cer-
tain limitations which have been adopted in jurisdictions which
have recognized the right. These are:
'Yovatt v. Wingard (1820), 1 Jac. & W. 394; Abernethy v. Hutchinson
(1825), 3 L. J. C. H. 209; Prince Albert v. Strange (1849), 1 McN. & G. 25;
Tuck v. Priest (1887), L. R. 19 Q. B. Div. 639; Pollard v. Photographic Co.
(1888), L. R. 40 Ch. Div. 345; Monson v. Tussauds Ltd. (1899), L. R. 1 Q. B.
Div. 679; Corelli v. Wall (1906), 22 L. T. Rep. 532. In the Prince Albert
case a bill was brought to enjoin the publication of a number of etchings
made by plaintiff for his own amusement. The court found not only a
property right, but also a breach of trust, and granted an injunction, hold-
ing that since "privacy is the right invaded, postponing the injunction
would be equivalent to denying it altogether." See Gately, LAW OF LIBEL
AND SLANDER, p. 28.
'See note, 89 A. S. R. 844.
'See Edwards, Right of Privacy and Equity Relief, 55 Cent. L. Journ.
123.
'Moore v. N. Y. Elev. R. Co. (1892), 130 N. Y. 523, 29 N. E. 997.
' Muetze v. Tuteur (1890), 77 Wis. 236, 46 N. W. 123, 20 A. S. R. 115, 9
L. R. A. 86; Thompson v. Adelberg & Berman (Ky. 1918), 205 S. W. 558.
' Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAnv. L. REv. 195.
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(1) The right of privacy does not prohibit any publication
of matter which is of public or general interest.
(2) The right to privacy does not prohibit the communica-
tion of any matter, though in its nature private, when
the publication is made under circumstances which
would render it a privileged communication under the
rules of libel and slander.
(3) There cannot be a grant of redress for the invasion of
privacy by oral publication.
(4) The right to privacy ceases upon the publication of the
facts by the individual or with his consent.
(5) The truth of the matter published does not afford a
defense.
(6) The absence of malice in the publisher is no defense.
Within a few years of the publication of this article a series of
decisions was made in suits predicated on the existence of a
right of privacy which arrayed the jurisdictions involved in un-
compromising conflict on the question of the legal existence of
the right, and resulting in a few states in statutory recognition
of the right in a modified form.9 It is to be noted that a number
of photograph cases where the decisions were ostensibly put on
the basis of breach of contract, violation of trust, or existence of
a right of property, the right ultimately involved was the plain-
tiff's right to be free from unwarranted publicity.10
The existence of a right of privacy in the absence of statute
has been denied in New York,"3 Michigan,12 Rhode Island,, and
Washington,-4 and vigorously affirmed in Georgia,', Kentucky,0
and Kansas.17 In Missouri- and New Jersey- the recognition
of the right has been confused with the question of property
rights in photographs.
In New York the famous Roberson v. Rochester Box Co. case
had several antecedents which may be briefly noted. In the un-
reported case of Manola v. Stevens a bill was filed to restrain the
This article and Ragland, The Right of Privacy, in 17 Ky. L. Journ. 85
(Jan. 1929), are leading contributions on the subject.
'N. Y. Civil Rights Law, C. 50, 51. Also Pen. Code Cal., 1909 p. 258.
"See article in 28 YALE L. JotrN. 269.
'Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co. (1902), 171 N. Y. 540, 64 N. E.
444.
Atkinson v. Doherty (1899), 121 Mich. 372, 80 N. W. 285.
Henry v. Cherry (1909), 30 R. I. 13, 73 A. 97.
"Hillman v. Star Pub. Co. (1911), 64 Wash. 691, 117 P. 594.
"Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co. (1905), 122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68.
"Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn (1910), 134 Ky. 424, 120 S. W. 364.
"Kunz v. Allen (1918), 102 Kan. 883, 172 P. 532.
"Munden v. Harris (1911), 153 Mo. A. 652, 134 S.-WV. 1076.
"Edison v. Edison Polyform Co. (1907), 67 A. 392.
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use of a photograph of the plaintiff, an actress, taken sur-
reptitiously. An injunction was granted, no defense being
made. In the following year an injunction was granted by the
New York Supreme Court in favor of a physician to restrain the
unauthorized publication of his name in a recommendation of a
medical preparation. 20 In this case the right was at least im-
pliedly recognized. The right seemed to have been clearly recog-
nized in Schuyler v. CurtiS21 in 1892, but the case was reversed
on the ground that the right of privacy dies with the person,
and that no such right exists in relatives of the deceased person
as to prevent the making of a statue of her.22 In Murray v. Gast
Lithographic Co., 23 a suit to enjoin the publication of a picture
of an infant child, although the point was not definitely settled,
the court uses the following language, showing a reversal of the
previous tendency:
"If, . . . it be insisted that the parent has suffered a
personal injury,-one to his mental sensibility, by the in-
vasion of his child's right to the enjoyment of personal
privacy, and the indiscriminate distribution of her por-
traits,-the answer is that the law does not take cognizance
of, and will not afford compensation for, sentimental injury,
independent of redress for a wrong involving physical in-
jury to person or property. 'The law protects the property
and the person.' The person includes the reputation. The
body, reputation, and property of the citizen are not to be
invaded without responsibility in damages to the sufferer.
But outside these protected spheres, the law does not at-
tempt to guard the peace of mind, the feelings, or the happi-
ness of everyone. . . . The temperaments of individuals
are various and variable, and the imagination exerts a
powerful and incalculable influence in injuries of this kind.
There are many moral obligations too delicate and subtle to
be enforced in the rude way of giving money compensation
for their violation."
This tendency was definitely recognized in the decisive Rober-
son case in which a bill was brought to restrain the use of plain-
tiff's picture in a flour advertisement. The injunction was de-
nied by a vote of four to three, reversing the decision of the
lower court.2 ' The opinion clearly and unambiguously denies
" Mackenzie v. Soden (1891), 27 Abb. N. C. 402, 18 N. Y. S. 240.
(1892), 24 N. Y. S. 512.
" Schuyler v. Curtis (1895), 147 N. Y. 434, 42 N. E. 22. The dissent by
J. Gray should be noted.
U (1894), 8 Misc. 36, 28 N. Y. S. 271.
(1901) 64 App. Div. 30, 71 N. Y. S. 876.
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the existence of a right of privacy, the court holding that there
is no precedent in decisions, that the right is not referred to by
writers, that the recognition of such a right would overwhelm
the courts with litigation and might result in unreasonable op-
pression. It was unreasonable, wrote Judge Parker, for a per-
son to expect to go through the world without having his picture
published. The dissenting opinion, by Judge Gray, points out
the obvious fallacies in the reasoning of the majority view, show-
ing it to be a decision of expediency rather than one of legal
rationality. As might be expected, the decision proved highly
unpopular and in the following year a statute was passed to
remedy the situation." The constitutionality of this statute was
upheld in 1908.27 A considerable body of law in interpretation
of this statute has grown up, but cannot be treated within the
scope of this paper.28 It cannot be said that the New York
statute, which provides for both criminal liability and injunctive
relief, has adequately met the need which stimulated its pas-
sage. Since it applies only to the use of names and photographs
for advertising purposes, it could not remedy the wrong with
which we are confronted in the principal case. Nor would it
apply to other actionable forms of invasions of the right of
privacy, short of libel and slander.
In Michigan the question arose in a suit in equity brought by
relatives of a deceased person to restrain the use of the name
and likeness of the deceased as part of a label for a brand of
cigars.20 The court held that there was no authority for the
recognition of such a right, and since the right asserted in the
case was not based on a right of property nor one arising from
contract the injunction must be refused.
In Henry v. Cherry & Webb30 the Rhode Island court held that
"there is no common law right of privacy, entitling a person to
" For a brief statement regarding the right of privacy and the press see
W. G. Hale, THE LAW OF THE PRESS, p. 243.
Chapter 132 of the Laws of N. Y., p. 308.
'Rhodes v. Sperry (1908), 193 N. Y. 223, 85 N. E. 1097.
Noteworthy cases under the N. Y. Statute are: Jeffries v. N. Y. Eve-
ning Journal Co. (1910), 67 Misc. 570, 124 N. Y. S. 780; Colyer v. Fox Pub.
Co. (1914), 162 App. Div. 297, 146 N. Y. S. 999; Merle v. Sociological Re-
search Film Corp. (1915), 166 App. Div. 376, 152 N. Y. S. 829; Humiston
v. Universal Film Mfg. Co. (1919), 178 N. Y. S. 752; D'Altamonte v. N. Y.
Herald Co. (1923), 154 App. Div. 453, 139 N. Y. S. 200; Damron v. Double-
day Doran & Co. Inc. (1928), 231 N. Y. S. 444. In Rosenwasser v. Ogoglia
(1916), 172 App. Div. 107, 158 N. Y. S. 56, it was held that the statute does
not extend to a copartnership, which is an association of individuals for
purposes of trade. Such a holding might logically be followed in jurisdic-
tions which recognize the right of privacy in the absence of statute.
(1899), 121 Mich. 372, 80 N. W. 285.
(1909), 30 R. I. 13, 73 Atl. 97.
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damages for mental suffering by the publication of his picture
as a part of an advertisement of automobile coats without his
permission, though it exposes him to the jeers of those who
recognized his picture in the advertisement." The court was im-
pressed by a fear that "the right of privacy contended for would
embrace all forms of interference with the mental well-being
of an individual, whether by publishing his picture, by gossip,
or by pointing him out as possessed of peculiar qualities." The
court, however, overlooks the fact that in the field of privacy,
as well as in the field of libel and slander, definite and well-
founded limitations to the general rule guard against extreme
applications.8 1
In Washington the negation of the right occurred in a case
the facts of which merited some form of relief in favor of the
plaintiff.8 2  In this case it was held that the publication in a
newspaper of the photograph of a young girl in connection with
an article stating that her father was to be arrested for using
the mails to defraud was not the invasion of any legal right of
privacy so as to be actionable on the part of the girl, there being
no legal remedy for any wrong done to her in its publication. In
supporting the defendant's contention the court states: "The
defense in this case is purely technical, a call to precedent as it
has been established. A wrong is admitted, but it is said there
is no remedy. We regret to say that this position is well taken."
In opposition to the narrower views of the above-named juris-
dictions Georgia gave complete recognition to the right of pri-
vacy in the leading case of Pavesich v. New England Life Ins.
Co. 33 In reversing the lower court and allowing recovery the
court holds that the plaintiff has a good cause of action against
defendant for a publication in a newspaper advertisement of
plaintiff's picture without his consent, which picture tended to
bring him into ridicule. Explaining the viewpoint of the court,
Judge Cobb writes:
"It is to be conceded that prior to 1890 every case which
might be said to involve the right of privacy was not based
on the recognition of such a right, but was founded upon a
supposed right of property, or a breach of trust or confi-
dence, or the like, and therefore a claim to a right of privacy
independent of a property or contractual right, or some
right of a similar nature, had, up to that time never been
recognized. . . . The entire absence of a precedent for
an asserted right should have the effect to cause the courts
See articles cited in footnote 8.
Hillman v. Star Publishing Co. (1911), 64 Wash. 691, 117 P. 594.
- (1905), 122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68, 69 L. R. A. 101, 106 A. S. R. 104.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol14/iss3/7
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to proceed with caution before recognizing the right, for
fear that they may thereby invade the province of the law-
making power; but such absence, even for all time, is not
conclusive of the question as to the existence of the right.
The novelty of the complaint is no objection when an injury
cognizable by law is shown to have been inflicted on the
plaintiff. . . . The right of privacy has its foundation
in the instincts of nature. It is recognized intuitively,
consciousness being the witness that can be called to estab-
lish its existence. . . . The right of personal security
is not fully accorded by allowing an individual to go through
life in possession of all of his members and his body un-
marred; nor is his right to personal liberty fully accorded
by merely allowing him to remain out of jail or free from
other physical restraints."
The convincing logic of the Pavesich case had its effect in the
crystallization of the Kentucky holding in the case of the Foster-
Milburn Co. v. Chinn in 1909. 34 Here the plaintiff was repre-
sented as having indorsed a patent medicine. Although the de-
cision was put on the joint grounds of libel and invasion of pri-
vacy the court states, "While there is some conflict in the au-
thorities we concur with those holding that a person is entitled to
the right of privacy as to his picture, and that the publication
of his picture without consent for advertising is a violation of
the right of privacy, and entitles him to recover without proof
of special damages." This view was affirmed in another case in
1912. 35
Missouri took a modified stand in favor of the right in 1911
although the decision in the case, involving the use of a picture
for advertising purposes, was put on the ground of a property
right in the picture.36 The court criticizes the Roberson v.
" 134 Ky. 424, 120 S. W. 364. It is interesting to note that this case had
some precedent in the early case of Grigsby v. Breckenbridge, 65 Ky. 480,
92 Am. Dec. 509 (1867), in which it was held that the sender of a letter
may enjoin its publication by the recipient or others.
" Douglas v. Stokes (1912), 149 Ky. 506, 149 S. W. 849. In this case it
was held that one who employs a photographer to photograph the dead body
of his malformed child may recover damages in case the latter copyrights
the picture and attempts to use it for his own purposes. Although the de-
cision is put on the ground of an implied agreement to make prints only
for the plaintiff, the court uses this language: "The most tender affections
of the human heart cluster about the body of one's dead child. A man may
recover for any injury or indignity done to the body, and it would be a re-
proach to the law if physical injuries might be recovered for, and not those
incorporeal injuries which would cause much greater suffering and
humiliation."
'Munden v. Harris (1911), 153 Mo. A. 652, 134 S. W. 1076.
Washington University Open Scholarship
NOTES
Rochester Box Co. case saying: "It may be admitted that the
right of privacy is an intangible right, but so are numerous
others which no *one would think of denying to be legal rights,
which would be protected by the courts. It is spoken of as a
new right, when, in fact, it is an old right with a new name."
The property basis followed in the Missouri holding was in ac-
cord with that of an earlier New Jersey case, Edison v. Edison
Polyform Mfg. Co.37  In 1918 Kansas joined the liberal forces
by holding that the exhibition in a moving picture of a photo-
graph of plaintiff for advertising purposes was a violation of
the right.88
Before considering the position of the principal case in the
evolutionary growth of the doctrine, several cases which mark
the development of the law of privacy in other phases should be
noted briefly. That public officers, charged with the enforce-
ment of the criminal laws, and having in their custody indi-
viduals charged with crime, may use photographs for the pur-
pose of identifying the individuals accused was held in Mabry
v. Kettering." But where the accused person has been found to
be innocent, it is held that he may enjoin the placing of his
photograph in the rogues' gallery.40 Another and different ap-
plication of the doctrine of personal security was made in
Schultz v. Frankfort Marine Accident Co.41 in which it was held
that the open or rough shadowing of a person who was wanted
to remain as an available witness was actionable. Although the
decision is put on the ground of libel it is none the less true that
the facts of this case take it out of the categories of the ordinary
libel cases and serve to give it significance in the field of privacy.
In Byfietd v. Candler2 it was held that a passenger on a vessel
is entitled to the privacy of the room to which she has been as-
signed as against improper or unreasonable intrusions of others.
In the principal case a coordinate question which presents it-
self is as to the extent to which a creditor may go in giving pub-
licity to a debt in order to coerce its payment. The two interests
which conflict in such cases are on the one hand the creditor's
right to stimulate the payment of debts owing to him, and on the
other hand, the debtor's right to be free from unwarranted and
obnoxious publicity about matters distinctly personal. Viewed
from this light the question is ultimately one of justification of
method in the attempt to preserve an interest which the law
- (1907), 67 A. 392. This case and another in the same volume, Van-
derbilt v. Mitchell, 67 A. 97, strongly criticize the Roberson case.
" Kunz v. Allen (1918), 102 Kan. 883, 172 P. 532.
* (1909), 89 Ark. 551, 117 S. W. 746, 16 Ann. Cas. 1123.
Itzkovich v. Whitaker (La. 1905), 115 La. 479, 39 S. 499.
(1918), 151 Wis. 53, 139 N. W. 386.(Ga., 1924), 125 S. E. 905.
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recognizes. A further complication arises from the fact that
the law of libel is not adequate to meet such situations, inasmuch
as truth forms a complete defense to an action of libel in mostjurisdictions. May the creditor publish to the world that the
debtor has long owed him money and refuses to pay, and then
rely on the truth of the assertion to defeat an action of libel
where all the other elements of libel exist? If we hold that the
creditor cannot do so, we are faced with the necessity of creat-
ing an exception to the well-established rule that truth is a com-
plete defense to an action for civil libel, or the more logical and
satisfactory solution of the recognition of the right of privacy
as in the principal case. 43
This problem has arisen in several cases, and the inability to
discriminate between the libel and privacy theories has been
conducive to obscure and ambiguous rationalization. In
Muetz v. Tuteur,44 a Wisconsin case, the sending of a red en-
velope to plaintiff marked "For collecting bad debts," and in
Thompson v. Adelberg & Berman" the leaving at plaintiff's resi-
dence of large collector's notices in conspicuous positions were
held to support an action of libel. In both of these cases the
courts overlooked the possibility of the truth of the existence
of the debts involved, and treated the method of collection em-
ployed by the defendants as unwarranted and tending to dis-
grace and humiliate the plaintiff, and therefore libellous.46
It is submitted that the principal case is no more than a logi-
cal and reasonable application of the right of privacy as pre-
viously developed. The writer maintains that not only should
the right of privacy be recognized as a necessary complement of
the law of libel, but that this development should come through
the amplification of the existing common law rather than
through statutory enactments which, in fields such as this one,
have often proved to be inflexible and inadequate. The re-
luctance to recognize sentimental injury, the lack of precedent,
and the possibility of increased litigation are unconvincing argu-
ments against the recognition of a new phase of the old right of
personal security, particularly when such recognition is made
urgently necessary by "modern" journalistic methods and
"progressive" forms of enforcing the collection of debts. Ex-
"Obviously, the necessity for such a choice would not exist in those few
jurisdictions where, by statutory change or common law development, the
general rule that truth is a defense to libel has been modified.
"(1890), 77 Wis. 236, 20 A. S. R. 115, 9 L. R. A. 86.
"(Ky., 1918), 205 S. W. 558.
"In State v. Armstrong (1891), 106 Mo. 395, 16 S. W. 604, the use of the
words "Bad Debt Collecting Agency" on the face of an envelope was held to
subject defendant to a prosecution for criminal libel. It should be remem-
bered, however, that truth generally is not a defense to criminal libel.
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pressive of this feeling are the words of Dean Pound: "A man's
feelings are as much a part of personality as his limbs. The
actions that protect the latter from injury may well be made to
protect the former by the ordinary processes of legal growth."47
SAM ELSON, '30.
POWERS OF RECEIVERS APPOINTED IN MORTGAGE
FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS
It often becomes necessary for a court of equity to appoint a
receiver of mortgaged property pending foreclosure, either to
preserve the corpus of the estate from deterioration, or to se-
quester the rents and profits to make good an anticipated de-
ficiency, or for some other cogent reason. The question which
at times seems perplexing is just how far a court of equity may
go in giving the receiver power over property incident to, but
not covered by the mortgage. In a recent federal case,' a fore-
closure suit to sell mortgaged property and apply the proceed'
to the mortgage debt, the receiver was directed to take charge
of all company property, and to receive the rents, earnings, is-
sues, profits, and income therefrom, although the mortgage did
not cover all the assets of the company. On appeal this direc-
tion in the case was reversed, because though "the court had
power to appoint the receiver-it did not have the power to di-
rect him to take charge of any property not covered by the mort-
gage." Granting that it is often laid down as a concrete rule
that the mortgagee has no equitable right to have the receiver-
ship extended over other property of the mortgagor not em-
braced in the mortgage, 2 still we must not lose sight of the under-
lying reasons for having a receiver. The object of appointing
a receiver is to preserve the property for the benefit of all parties
interested,3 and if this object is best attained by continuing the
business, such procedure has a strong argument in its favor.
Perhaps the primary objection to such an extension of the re-
ceiver's dominion is the hindrance of other creditors of the mort-
gagor from subjecting the property not included in the mortgage
to the payment of their debts. This general doctrine is stated
in Scott v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co.,4 an important federal
case, and will be considered later.
"28 HARV. L. REv. 343.
'A. B. Leach & Co. v. Grant (1928), 27F (2d) 201.
'As in 27 Cyc. 1623; Gluck & Becker, RECEIVERS OF CORPORATIONS, p.
281; Smith v. McCullough (1881), 104 U. S. 25.
'Knickerbocker v. McKinley Coal Co. (1898), 172 Ill. 535, 50 N. E. 330,
64 Am. St. Rep. 54.
- (1895), 69 F. 17.
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